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Abstract: In this paper we consider some of the ethical challenges inherent in the regulation of 
discretionary police power. Discretion is central to police policy and practice, but it also 
provides a level of freedom that opens up the space for injustice and inequity, and this is seen 
most vividly in recent debates about unfairness and racial profiling in the distribution and 
experience of police stops in the US and UK. How to regulate discretionary power is a 
challenging question, and this is especially so in the context of practices like stop-and-
search/stop-and-frisk. The ability to stop people in the street and question them is central to 
policing as it is understood in many liberal democracies, but under conditions of unfairness 
and questionable efficacy – when the application of this particular police power appears 
unethical as well as ineffective – one can reasonably ask whether the power should be dropped 
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Dubber (2005) describes the police power as unlimited, and while he was referring 
to a concept of police much broader than the uniformed public police service that 
is our focus here, it is certainly true that the police remit is both broad in terms of 
its potential objects (threats to the stability of established social order) and wide in 
the set of means available to achieve its aims (up to and including the use of 
deadly force). The extent of the power vested in police, the fact that most officers 
operate in low visibility settings, and the discretion many of them wield – all these 
factors create significant problems of oversight, governance and, inevitably, ethics. 
That policing tactics and techniques are often only loosely constrained in law 
and/or are unavailable to other actors (Brodeur 2010) serves only to make these 
issues more pertinent and more pressing.  
Our goal in this piece is to consider some of the ethical challenges inherent in 
the regulation of discretionary police power. Invoking the ability to address a 
situation either formally (evoking legal categories) or informally (using situated 
problem solving), discretion is central to police policy and practice, but it also 
provides a level of freedom that opens up the space for injustice and inequity, and 
this is seen most vividly in recent debates about unfairness and racial profiling in 
the distribution and experience of police stops in the US and UK. Police are able 
to use a huge range of tactics to address the problems they encounter, yet the low 
visibility and high discretion granted to street-level officers ensures that only 
relatively rarely will these solutions be ‘second-guessed’ by supervisors or, more 
pertinently, external review processes. This is arguably a characteristic of all police, 
but these issues pose particular problems in liberal democratic states where the 
power of the state over citizens is, at least from an ideological perspective, 
constrained. In such contexts, police indeed remain something of an exceptional 
power – one that poses a significant threat to liberties many would consider both 
well-established and inviolable.  
How to regulate discretionary power, to channel it in ethically desirable 
directions, is a challenging question, and this is especially so in the context of 
practices like stop-and-search/stop-and-frisk. The ability to stop people in the 
street and question them is central to policing as it is understood in many liberal 
democracies, but under conditions of unfairness and questionable efficacy – when 
the application of this particular police power appears unethical as well as 
ineffective – one can reasonably ask whether the power should be dropped or 
curtailed, and if curtailed, how this would work in practice. Changing the legal 
landscape may help, particularly as it relates to racial profiling. One solution to the 
problem of inequitable policing outcomes may be to make the practices that 
produce them illegal, and then enforce such laws with established and/or new or 
novel mechanisms. But the empirical fact that police need to be able to deal at 
least provisionally with the huge range of problems with which they are 
confronted limits this possibility in important ways. Police officers are the first, 
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and often only, responders to a huge variety of situations and events; they require 
an ability to react to and (re)direct these events that is – due to the significant 
freedom and discretion required – by definition difficult if not impossible to 
codify within a set of legal rules. What is the ‘right thing’ to do, in a given 
situation, cannot be determined in such a manner. 
How might these policies and practices be regulated? Whether the onus 
comes from a change in the legal landscape or from other cultural, social and 
political pressures, there are in our minds three main ways in which the ethical 
curtailment – or perhaps more precisely re-direction – of stop-and-search/stop-
and-frisk practices might be achieved “on the ground.” First, the visibility of 
police activity could be increased – something that is already occurring as a result 
of the uptake of camera phones and other mobile technologies, the work of 
‘citizen journalists’ and others, and policy movement toward officers using and 
wearing video cameras. Yet, while the importance of such developments should 
not be understated they are unlikely to provide a panacea; the camera can lie and 
there will always be a limit to what can and should be recorded.  
Second, in a related but wider sense, extrinsic modes of bureaucratic 
regulation can be utilized that motivate either individual officers or police 
organizations to behave in a more ethical fashion, by which we mean acting in line 
with established norms of probity and right, in ways that respect the rights of 
citizens to be as free from intrusive state power as possible, being honest and 
transparent, and so forth. By extrinsic, we mean authority structures and processes 
either within police organizations, aimed at directing officer practice (e.g. reward 
and disciplinary schemes), or outside police organizations, aimed at directing the 
activity of the organization as a whole (e.g. civilian oversight, Police and Crime 
Commissioners etc.).  
This is, by and large, the ‘traditional’ approach to corralling the power of the 
police and directing it in normatively desirable directions. It has claimed some 
success, with police practice in many developed countries changing for the better 
over the years as a result of regulatory change and related factors. While it may be 
impossible to come up with a definitive list of things police can and cannot do (see 
above), particular behaviours (such as aggressive interrogations) can be, and have 
been, curtailed and often prohibited. Such change has frequently been associated 
with extrinsic pressure on police organizations to change their practices or suffer a 
loss of material or symbolic capital.  
  Yet, despite these developments, present-day police practice is plainly still far 
from ideal – witness, precisely, the on-going scandals about police stop practices in 
contexts as diverse as Scotland (Murray, 2014), Spain (Añón et al., 2013) and the 
United States (Tyler et al., 2014). Simply banning (making illegal) particular 
practices does not mean that they do not take place, and as we describe below, 
there are two important reasons for the continued failure of regulatory change to 
rein in the power of the police and direct police activity in more desirable 
directions. Not only do external modes of regulation continuously run into the 
twin problems of discretion and (in)visibility, but most are premised on 
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instrumental understandings of human motivation that, evidence suggests, are not 
particularly well-suited to explaining the ways people actually behave in social 
settings. 
Third, intrinsic modes of regulation can be encouraged or enhanced. Our 
central theme in this paper is the idea that the legitimacy that police command and 
require, both externally and internally, may be pivotal to this process. On the one 
hand, police at the organizational level are engaged in a continuous process of 
establishing and reproducing their legitimacy among those they police; this means 
that they must – to some extent – be responsive to, and in tune with, the 
communities they serve. Police cannot, in other words, simply do what they want. 
Legitimacy is founded in public perceptions of fairness, probity, honesty and 
lawfulness (although the situation in some developing countries may provide an 
interesting counterpoint, where effectiveness may be relatively or absolutely more 
important – Karakus, 2015; Jackson et al. 2014; Bradford et al. 2013; Tankebe 
2009; although see Akinlabi, 2015; and Kochel et al., 2013) and the need for 
legitimacy acts as an empirical constraint on police power. If police wish to 
reproduce their legitimacy they are channelled toward behaving within certain 
limits; actions outside established normative frameworks will undermine 
legitimacy, and these limitations are likely to correlate closely with established 
ethical values – particularly in relation to notions of fairness. 
On the other hand, legitimacy within police organizations can motivate 
officers to behave in certain ways. The argument here is that: 
 
a) Organizational justice encourages identification with the organization. 
b) Identification with the organization leads to legitimation of its practices and 
processes and internalization of its values and goals. 
c) Legitimation and internalization motivates compliance with organizational rules 
and values. 
d) This process encourage officers to see themselves as legitimate, strengthening 
self-confidence and opening up the possibility for positive policing styles.  
 
Police organizations that have the right goals, that communicate these goals 
to staff, and that treat staff in organizationally fair ways may be able to motivate 
internal processes of legitimacy that are themselves constitutive of a check on 
police power, or at least will tend to channel it in desirable directions. 
It seems to us that – in the absence of fundamental change to the role of 
police in liberal democracies (which is not quite as far-fetched as it might seem if 
contractual, private-sector type arrangements gain even greater traction than is 
currently the case) – and given the intractable problems associated with the 
application of extrinsic constraints on officer behaviour, questions of legitimacy 
should take centre-stage in efforts to exert constraints on police discretionary 
power and encourage ethical policing. In particular, the internal notion of 
legitimacy seems to offer significant possibilities, not least because it can bypass 
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currents in public opinion inimical to limits on police power (at least when this is 
directed at denigrated out-groups and ‘others’), yet is at the same time amenable to 
external influence from, for example, democratically elected oversight bodies. 
Which is to say, in addition, that legitimacy backed up by extrinsic modes of 
regulation (and greater visibility) is likely to be a particularly effective strategy. 
However, as we describe below this is not an entirely one-way street, and it is 
entirely possible that legitimacy also opens up the space for unethical behaviours. 
In the following pages we consider the three strategies outlined above in the 
context of regulating stop and search/frisk and similar policing tactics. This is an 
example of the sort of police activities that raise questions about individual rights, 
of structural racism, procedural and distributive justice, and the limits of police 
power and legitimacy (and which many believe need to change), and to set the 
scene we first introduce the issue of stop and search/frisk. We focus primarily on 
the UK given the context in which we both work – but much of what follows will 




STOP AND SEARCH/FRISK 
 
The power to stop, question, temporarily detain, and search people ‘on the streets’ 
is one of the most controversial powers vested in the police in the UK, the US, 
and increasingly elsewhere (e.g. Open Society Justice Initiative 2009). Legally 
speaking, this police power is often relatively constrained, albeit wide-ranging. In 
most circumstances police cannot simply decide to ‘randomly’ stop and/or search 
people. But there are important exceptions in some contexts. In England and 
Wales, for instance, various forms of the power are enshrined in law, the most 
important of which is Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 
otherwise known as PACE. PACE applies a reasonable suspicion test, meaning 
police must have a justifiable reason for stopping someone with a view to 
searching them. But other pieces of legislation do not, notably s60 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which allows officers to search a person 
without suspicion. Searches under these powers, although they occur in public 
spaces, can be relatively invasive; and individuals stopped are required by police to 
stay for the duration of, and acquiesce to, any search that follows, and officers can 
use force to ensure they do so. 
Despite the existence of legal constraints, the conduct of street stops is a 
classically low visibility, high discretion, police activity. Street-level officers get to 
decide whom to stop, when and where, with very little possibility of external 
oversight (of individual stops – the overall number of stops is a potential target for 
external regulation, and police can be, and often are, encouraged to 
increase/decrease the number of stops they conduct). The importance of 
discretion here is magnified by the fact that police have a range of what might be 
termed sub-legal powers to ‘stop’ people and question them in the street. In some 
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countries, such as Scotland, it is known that the use of ‘consent’ searches is 
widespread, since many are recorded by police (Murray 2014). Elsewhere the use 
of ‘consent’ as an enabler of police activity is assumed to be widespread but its 
extent remains largely hidden (Dixon 2008). Sub-legal tools available to police to 
garner consent for a stop range from the inherent authority police command in 
relation to significant numbers of people – to whom a simple question from a 
police officer may be experienced as requiring a response – to the ability of police 
to draw other informal sources of power and influence to direct behaviour. 
Moreover, in continental Europe and elsewhere the ability of and often the 
requirement that police conduct ID checks offers a further range of opportunities 
for police to interdict and question people. 
In a general sense, a power to stop, question and search people that is short 
of a full arrest is useful for both police and the policed (in the latter case mainly 
because of the well-known negative implications arising from being arrested – it is 
often argued that if police did not have the power to stop and search they would 
turn to the more invasive power of arrest as a means to achieving the same ends). 
Yet, public encounters with the police provide moments in which the legitimacy of 
the police is asserted, tested, and all too often undermined (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; 
Jackson et al., 2012a; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Geller et al., 2014; Tyler et al., 2014; 
Slocum et al., 2015). Whether governed by statute or based on the sociological 
power of police to intervene in people’s lives, stop and search/frisk encounters 
can take place in almost any of the contexts within which police and public 
interact. Officers conducting a stop are, implicitly or explicitly, making a claim as 
to the rightfulness of the authority vested in them. As a key part of the police 
‘voice’ in the legitimacy ‘dialogue’ envisioned by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), 
every stop and search encounter involves a claim that police are empowered to 
treat citizens in this way; that the nature and extent of this power is defensible; and 
that the ability of police to wield coercive force to ensure compliance is itself 
justified. The people stopped make judgements about these claims, asking whether 
the actions of the police were justified in this and similar cases; whether the officer 
acted proportionately and with the right intentions, or whether he or she was 
motivated by bias or prejudice; whether the laws on which this method of policing 
is based are themselves justified, in terms of the aims they embody and the 
fairness with which they are applied; and whether it is right that this officer can 
forcibly detain one if one resists. 
Stop and search remains a highly charged, contested and in many ways deeply 
problematic aspect of police practice. The proximate reason for this is ethnic and 
other disproportionalities in the experience of police stop and search activity. Stop 
and search has been a controversial issue for many years, in part because it is a 
mode of police practice that seems consistently to be unevenly applied: socially, 
geographically and, particularly, ethnically (Smith and Gray 1985; Keith 1993; 
Bowling and Philips 2002; Medina Ariza 2014; Bradford and Loader 2016). People 
from some ethnic minority groups are more likely to experience this form of 
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police contact than their majority-group counterparts, a phenomena which has, we 
should note, been identified well beyond the UK (see Weber and Bowling 2012). 
Black people living in England and Wales are stopped at a rate around 6 times that 
which their proportion in the general population would suggest is appropriate, for 
example (Shiner and Delsol 2015). This is a practice intimately caught up in the 
debate around institutional and other forms of racism within the police service, 
and with wider currents of ethnic and racial exclusion and oppression. 
Despite the underlying desirability of granting to police an investigatory tool 
that stops short of arrest, then, the wide-ranging power vested in police to initiate 
stop and search encounters poses problems for both parties involved. Police lose 
legitimacy when its use of power seems misdirected; the policed are dragged at 
least to the threshold of the criminal justice system; all lose when trust in the 
police is undermined. And these questions are made all the more pressing by the 
weight of evidence that the power stop and search/frisk can be, and is, misused 
and sometimes abused. There is the issue of ethnic disproportionality: racial 
profiling, and equally implicit bias and stereotyping, violate foundational principles 
of equality and citizenship, and such behaviours on the part of police serve as part 
of what Epp et al. (2014: 5) call a ‘broad, continuing pattern in which racial 
minorities are disproportionately subjected to suspicious inquiries without any 
particular basis or justification.’ Other disproportionalities have also been 
identified – by gender, age, social class and across other markers of exclusion 
(Bradford and Loader 2016) – and the typically low proportion of stop/searches 
that result in arrests is also an issue. The London Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS), for example, has recently improved its ‘hit rate’ (the proportion of stops 
resulting in an arrest) to around 20 per cent, from previous rates as low as 9 per 
cent. But this means that something like four out of five searches in London do 
not result in an arrest (although a larger proportion does lead to some other 
criminal justice outcome, such as a drugs warning). There is a constant concern 
that this implies a misuse of invasive police power. 
In sum, stop and search is a police power both necessary and in need of 
ethical constraint. While it is generally desirable that police have available to them 
investigatory powers that fall short of arrest, it is important that their use of these 
powers is restrained, appropriate and proportionate. Yet, evidence from a wide 
variety of contexts frequently suggests a lack of restraint, inappropriate 




FINDING THE BALANCE: ENABLING AND CONSTRAINING 
DISCRETIONARY POWER 
 
All this raises a number of important questions about the legitimacy of the power 
and the wider set of police practices it represents (proactive, police-led, coercive 
criminal justice interventions, see Tyler et al., 2015; Bowling and Philips 2007; 
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Delsol and Shiner 2006; Jackson et al. 2012b; Miller & D’Souza, 2015). How can 
the practice be effectively regulated such that it is wielded in a more ethically 
sustainable manner? What mechanisms can be put in place to encourage (if not, in 
the final analysis, to ensure) restraint, appropriateness and proportionality?  
In the rest of the paper we consider some of the ways in which constraint 
might be provided for, while at the same time recognizing that the existence of 
constraints on police activity also, perhaps paradoxically, enables the use of power 
– including in an unethical manner. In what follows we are interested in the 
regulation of police activity in its widest sense, as well as stop and search in 
particular, where much of this activity – including ‘police stops’ – occurs in 
settings either not governed by explicit law or, at least, where the police are given 
very significant discretion in how to apply the law. By regulation, we refer to 
setting the goal of an activity, monitoring it, and realigning it if it is found to be 
being misapplied or misdirected (Sanders 2008: 51) – of these, monitoring and 
realignment figure most prominently in the discussion – but, equally, we are 
concerned with the question of how to promote and maintain ethical standards 
within police organizations in a wider sense. By what mechanisms can police 
officers be encouraged to ‘do the right thing’? 
 
LIMITING POLICE DISCRETION THROUGH CHANGING THE LAW 
 
Most stops occur as and when officers, individually or in small groups, decide on 
whom to stop and for what reason – of course, the decision on whom not to stop 
is equally discretionary – albeit that such practice can also be directed by 
organizational policies and priority setting. Indeed, the extent of discretion 
available to police in this area seems likely to be one of the key factors driving 
ethnic and other disproportionalities in stop and search/frisk activity, not least 
because discretion – the ability to make decisions – enables and even motivates 
biased and stereotyped decision-making. Officers are often making differentiating 
or categorizing decisions at very short notice in low-information settings – it 
would hardly be surprising if they based these decisions on stereotypes, or were 
subject to implicit biases when doing so (Glaser 2015; Legewie, 2016). 
On the face of it, one way to realign police activity in this and related areas 
would be to place legal limits on officer discretion. It might seem, at first glance, 
relatively easy to come up with a list of circumstances within which stop and 
search could and could not be used. But such a task would likely fail, for the 
simple reason that, as noted by Bittner (1974: 35, quoted in Reiner 2010: 144), the 
job of the police is to produce contingent solutions ‘to an unknown problem, 
arrived at by unknown means’. The task of policing is so diffuse and wide-ranging 
that is impossible to come up with an a priori list of possible problems, the 
corollary being that potential solutions might be applied in an almost limitless set 
of circumstances. Discretion on what solution to use and when to use it is 
fundamental to the practice of police, and to limit it would not only fundamentally 
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alter the nature of policing but would also make it less effective. As an important 
tool of policing, not least because it is less invasive than arrest, stop and search 
provides a potential ‘solution’ to an extremely large number of ‘problems’, and the 
ethics of its use – whether or not it is the right thing to do – will vary on an almost 
case-by-case basis. 
Police discretion is also vital for another reason: it is impossible to enforce all 
laws, all of the time; or even for a fraction of the time (Goldstein 1963). Police are 
constantly engaged in the process of deciding when, where and on whom the law 
should be applied, and for all that this is a highly imperfect process (the law is 
misapplied, the ‘wrong’ people are targeted) it is also inevitable. As Goldstein 
pointed out, it is, first, simply not feasible to enforce all laws or sanction their 
transgression in every case, not least because resources are limited. Second, police 
have other aims, such as ‘keeping the peace’ and assisting people in need, which 
can and do conflict with any requirement to enforce the law. To return to the 
example at hand, it might be argued that police should be required to stop and 
search an individual when, for example, they have a strong suspicion of drug use, 
and that this requirement might be offset by raising the ‘reasonable suspicion’ bar 
in some way, such that discretion is limited at the top and the bottom of the scale. 
But to impinge on discretion in this way would create more problems than it 
solved, as when, for example, a ‘required’ search might increase the risk of public 
disorder. Police officers are constantly engaged in balancing these types of 
competing demands. 
We do not, then, focus on legal solutions in this paper. This is not because 
we believe that the law has no place in regulating the power of the police, but 
rather because we take seriously the findings of 50 years of police research that 
have found legal regulation to be only one factor among many influencing police 
activity and, many would claim, a relatively minor one at that (Bittner 1990; 
Ericson 1982; Reiner 2010). We ask, instead, how and by whom can stop and 
search be effectively scrutinized, and how can change be effected, if its use is 
found to be out of kilter with norms of probity and justice? We discuss three 
possible ways that stop and search practice – and by extension other police activity 
– might brought into and maintained within a set of ethical standards or 
constraints: (a) increasing visibility; (b) extrinsic motivation of individuals and 
organizations; and (c) legitimacy and procedural justice inside and outside the 
police. These three headings are intended as heuristic rather than determinative 
categories, not least because there will plainly be significant overlap and interaction 
between them. They do, however, provide for a relatively wide-ranging set of 
possibilities. It is important to reiterate that legal proscription will have a part to 
play here, but it will inevitably be just one element of a wider process that, we 
might further suggest, will often exert pressure on police via one or more of the 








There is little doubt that policing is becoming more and more visible, in the sense 
that technological advances such as mobile phone cameras and internet 
connections mean that police activity that was previously visible only to those ‘at 
the scene’ can now be recorded, uploaded and viewed on-line more or less in real 
time (Goldsmith 2010). Social media ensure that the existence of any such 
recordings can be rapidly propagated, and there is an ever-increasing blurring of 
the lines between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ media that can trigger significant 
repercussions from particular events, as witnessed most dramatically in the furore 
surrounding many recent police shootings in the United States. Sanders’ (2008) 
call for ‘anchored pluralism’ in the regulation of police resonates with the idea that 
multiple actors can and should be involved in the monitoring of police via 
enhanced visibility. Whether policing is made visible by change within the service, 
via body worn video or similar technology, or outside the service via citizen 
‘sousveillance’ (Mann et al. 2003) of the police, this process may provide for more 
effective monitoring of police and constitute a lever through which to exert 
pressure for change. 
Considering the full effect of these developments on police behaviour is 
beyond the scope of this piece. In a general sense, though, we concur with the 
argument that the advent of new communication technologies means it is ‘highly 
probable that the new capacities for surveillance of policing inherent in these 
technologies may increase the police’s accountability to the public, while 
decreasing their account ability’ – that is, their ability to provide definitive 
accounts of events that cannot effectively be challenged by other participants 
(Goldsmith 2010: 915). It is hard to imagine that such developments will not, to 
some extent at least, curtail and channel the power of police in new and in all 
likelihood more ethically desirable (less aggressive, more conciliatory) directions. 
As proponents of deterrence theory have long emphasized (Ariel et al 2015: 516), 
even the suggestion of being watched can influence behaviour, for example, if the 
revelation of non-compliance risks reputational damage or punishment. Yet new 
communication technologies do not offer a panacea, as the recent (at the time of 
writing in November 2015) string of recordings of aggressive, violent and lethal 
police actions in various parts of the United States attests. Being recorded on 
someone’s mobile phone does not always deter police malpractice. Moreover, 
police often retain the ability to shape perceptions (most pertinently, in court) of 
what was reasonable or unreasonable to do in a given situation regardless of 
whether it happened to be caught on video or not (Brucato 2015). 
One specific example of technological change is worthy of a little more 
consideration, however, precisely because it often is presented as a panacea (Ariel 
et al. 2015: 510) that will resolve deep-seated issues in the relationship between 
police and publics – body worn video cameras (hereafter, BWV). These devices 
are increasingly being taken up by police organizations in the United States, United 
Kingdom and elsewhere (Jennings et al 2014), and they have been welcomed by 
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police and activist groups alike as a tool that will increase visibility and 
transparency, and thus enhance accountability (Brucato 2015) via a new system of 
monitoring mechanisms that was simply unavailable a decade ago. In terms of our 
example in this paper, one claim would be that stop/searches recorded by the 
police are less likely to escalate – since both parties are aware they are being 
recorded and adapt their behaviours to bring them in line established behavioural 
norms in relation to, for example, fair process (Ariel et al. 2015) – and if 
encounters do become more problematic as a result of the behaviour of either 
party, a record of what transpired will exist to aid any subsequent investigation.  
Again, this idea has face validity and seems likely to have some explanatory 
power. It would seem perverse to argue that the greater visibility provided by 
BWV will have no positive implications whatsoever. However as Brucato (2015) 
and others (e.g. Ledderman 2014) have argued there is significant danger in over-
emphasizing their potential benefits. First and most obviously, the people wearing 
the cameras choose when to turn them on and off. The decision on what to 
record and for how long will rest with individual officers, and while guidelines or 
more formal rules will obviously play some role (Kitzmueller 2014) the discretion 
vested in those officers will still grant them significant control over what gets 
recorded. Yet this is just one example of what Brucato (2015) argues is a much 
wider problem – the use of mobile recording technology does not obviate, and 
may even strengthen, the symbolic and actual power of police to ‘frame’ what is 
recorded, both literally (events recorded on BWV are by definition shown from 
the officer’s perspective) and figuratively. Despite increased challenges to their 
authority over recent years police remain ‘legitimate namers’ (Loader and Mulcahy 
2001), with a significant ability to define events and shape their resolution. To 
reiterate the point made above, this means that recordings from BWV are likely to 
be viewed from a police perspective and in a way that favours police 
interpretations of what transpired. 
In sum, while BWV and other ways of recording police activity are indeed 
likely to have made it more transparent and accountable, and possibly also more 
compliant with established norms of probity and fairness. However they do not 
constitute a magic wand, since they neither undermine the fundamental power of 
police to define events nor shift officer motivations much beyond reaction to a 
greater risk of being called out for inappropriate, undesirable or illegal behaviour. 
This last point is central. Almost all discussion of the influence of BWV and other 
recording technology on police officers has revolved around rational choice and 
deterrence theory – the presence of cameras deters them from behaviours they 
might otherwise have engaged in simply because the cameras increase the risk of 
censure and sanction. The emphasis is, then, on extrinsic motivations for 
behaviour that, we argue below, are not necessarily particularly strong or 
efficacious. On this basis alone increased surveillance of police is unlikely to solve 
on its own the problems thrown up by stop and search (and many other practices 
besides). 
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Extrinsic motivation of individuals and organizations 
Extrinsic motivations relate in essence to enticements and punishments. Rational 
choice (risk and reward) models of human behaviour appear as dominant in the 
human resource departments of police organizations as they are in many other 
public- and private-sector organizations (Kohn, 1999; Tyler, 2011). Rewards (such 
as performance-related pay) and punishments (such as fixed limits on sickness 
absence) are frequently used to motivate staff. The core idea is that individual 
officers can be motivated to modulate or realign their behaviour by external 
pressures. First, they will comply with rules, or conform to priorities when they 
believe they will be punished in some way if they do not. Stop and search might be 
encouraged or discouraged, for example, by threatening front-line officers with 
sanction if they conduct too many, or not enough. Second, they will respond to 
the promise of reward, and comply and cooperate when they feel they will gain 
from doing so. Organizations can of course be influenced in cognate ways – by 
the threat of disapproval, opprobrium or sanction from external actors who are 
symbolically, economically or legally relevant, or by the promise of financial or 
other rewards from the same sources.  
Tyler (2011: 27) contrasts such extrinsic motivations with intrinsic 
motivations that stem from personal values and moral beliefs (see below), and the 
efficacy of extrinsic motivations in relation to individuals is contested, albeit that 
their potential relevance in a hierarchical and quasi-military organization such as 
the police cannot be doubted. Police officers do act, and do refrain from acting, 
because they fear the threat of sanction or punishment. Perhaps more importantly, 
though, it seems almost certain that police organizations are open to influence via, 
in particular, the threat of sanction or disapproval from legally or politically 
relevant actors – particularly those with control legislation and/or budgets. 
An example of just such a process has been observed in London in recent 
years precisely in the arena of stop and search. Following a peak in the numbers of 
stop and searches around 2011/12, and a corresponding upsurge in the level of 
dispute around the practice – some of which was shaped by the aftermath of 
London riots in 2011 – the Home Secretary Theresa May made a number of 
highly critical comments about the Metropolitan Police’s (MPS) use of the power, 
which she repeated on numerous occasions over the next few years. In April 2014, 
for example, she said in Parliament that ‘if the numbers do not come down, if stop 
and search does not become more targeted, if those stop-to-arrest ratios do not 
improve considerably, the government will return with primary legislation to make 
those things happen’ (Guardian 2014). In the face of threats of an enforced 
change to its practice – and perhaps equally importantly to stigma associated with 
such a threat – it appears the MPS made significant changes in relation to the use 
of stop and search; or, at least, it encouraged its officers to do so. Over 468,000 
stop and searches under PACE section 1 and associated powers were conducted 
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in London in 2011/12;1 by the calendar year 2014 this had fallen to less than 
200,000.2 As noted above, arrest rates increased over the same period. It is 
important to note here that the use of power was not changed by legislation, but, 
apparently, by the mere threat of legislation, and the political pressure exerted by 
police not only by the Home Secretary but by activist groups as well (e.g. Release 
2014). 
Despite such apparent successes, however, it is unlikely that extrinsic 
motivations in relation to either officers or organization will be enough on their 
own to maintain an appropriate level of constraint on police power – or of ethical 
practice – in this or any other area. Notably, there was a previous reduction in the 
use of stop and search, and ethnic disproportionality, in England and Wales 
around the time of the Stephen Lawrence enquiry in 1999, and it is generally 
hypothesized that this reflected at least in part change in police practice in the face 
of significant public and political scrutiny in the wake of the scandal the enquiry 
uncovered (e.g. Shiner and Delsol 2015). However, as the political agenda changed 
and shifted focus in the early years of the new millennium the use of stop and 
search, and ethnic disproportionality, increased significantly. By the middle of the 
decade both had surpassed previous levels. 
Extrinsic motivations are by nature short-lived and even transitory. 
Individuals shift back to previous behaviour patterns once threats and rewards 
lose salience. This is a key criticism of, for example, performance related pay (Frey 
and Osterloh 2012; Perry et al. 2009) – it does not motivate long-term change to 
attitudes and behaviours. It seems organizations are much the same. Moreover the 
overall effect of even fundamental changes to the legal framework around stop 
and search – that might be expected to generate changes in practice by shifting 
structures of risk – is contested. Sanders (2008) claims, for example, that the 
introduction of PACE actually did little to affect street-level police practice, 
certainly as the ‘shock’ of its introduction receded. Of course, we might also note 
that there has been few if any convictions or other sanctioning of officers for 
breaking the PACE guidelines (c.f. HMIC 2013) and, of course, that many ‘police 
stops’ occur entirely outside the framework it established. 
  
Legitimacy and procedural justice inside and outside the police 
Our third set of possible ways to regulate the power of the police and motivate 
ethical practice revolve around the relationship the police have with the policed, 
and the ways in which police behaviour affects this relationship. In our view, the 
need for police to retain a certain level of legitimacy among the populations they 
serve provides an important empirical constraint on their behaviour and, 
moreover that processes of legitimation within the police may be critical for 
understanding how police behave in relation to the police. 
                                                     
1 http://www.stop-watch.org/your-area/area/metropolitan. 
2 MPS Stops and Searches Monitoring Mechanism, January 2015. Available at: 
http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/priorities_and_how_we_are_doing/borough/mps_stop_search_
mon_report_january2015.pdf. 
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The most important understanding of the relationship people have with 
police and other legal authorities is currently provided by work conducted under 
the banner of procedural justice theory. Developed by Tom Tyler and colleagues 
in the US (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler 2006a, 2006b; Tyler and Blader 2000; 
Tyler and Huo 2002) and increasingly applied in contexts across the world (e.g. 
Hinds and Murphy 2007; Tankebe 2009; Hasisi & Weisburd, 2011; Huq et al., 
2011; Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Factor et al., 2013; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Jackson 
et al., 2014; Bradford et al., 2014; Slocum et al., 2015; Pennington, 2015; Cheng, 
2015; Saarikkomäki, 2015; Akinlabi, 2015; Van Damme, 2015; Wolfe et al., 2015; 
Cavanagh & Cauffrana, 2015; Mclean & Wolfe, 2015; Reisig & Bain, 2015; 
Bieijersbergen et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2016), procedural justice theory stresses 
the social connection between criminal justice agencies and the populations they 
serve. Studies of the general population have found that people regard the police 
as legitimate when and if they believe officers exercise their authority through fair 
and impartial means – that is, when they behave in a procedurally just manner 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a; Tyler and Huo 2002; Jackson et al, 2013).  
There is also some evidence of procedural justice effects among what might 
be termed ‘offender populations’ (Paternoster et al. 1997; Papachristos et al., 2012; 
Barrajon et al., 2015; Murphy et al. 2016) and in relation to other criminal justice 
agencies, for example prisons, which unlike the police deal primarily with such 
populations (Sparks et al. 1995; Robinson and McNeil 2008; Liebling 2004; 
Brunton-Smith & McCarthy, 2015). It seems that the associations between 
experiences of policing, trust and legitimacy described above are found among 
social groups or categories of individual who might be expect to be alienated from 
the police and thus uninterested in the expressive aspects of police behaviour, 
although this is not of course to claim that procedural justice effects are in any 
sense universal. 
Procedural justice is marked and demonstrated by transparency, fair, 
equitable and respectful treatment, following correct procedure and not exhibiting 
bias, and a feeling of control over the processes through which people interact 
with authorities. People place particular value on voice (Hirschman 1970) during 
interactions, neutrality on the part of the authority, treatment with respect and 
dignity, and a sense of trust, meaning that the term ‘procedural justice’ refers to 
neither process in a technical sense – for example in terms of court process or 
police protocol – nor to justice in a normative or philosophical sense. Rather, what 
is at stake is individuals’ subjective judgements about the quality of interpersonal 
interaction with police officers and the openness of police decision-making 
processes that affect them. Treatment that is experienced as fair, decent and 
respectful encourages people to trust the police; a general perception that police 
behave in a fair way promotes a similar sense of trust. Despite the lack of formal 
correspondence between ‘procedural justice’ and more legally informed notions of 
‘fair process’ it is an interesting feature of work on procedural justice that there is a 
strong correspondence between lay understandings of the way criminal justice 
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agencies should behave and institutional and legal structures intended to govern 
their behaviour – what in the US might be termed ‘due process’ and a respect for 
individual’s rights, for example – which are themselves oriented toward objective 
criteria of justice and probity.3  
Importantly, research has failed to find consistent links between perceptions 
of the instrumental effectiveness of police and legitimacy (ironically, perhaps, if 
police officers believe that their legitimacy is earnt by effectiveness not procedural 
justice, see Nix, 2015). While in some contexts, such as developing countries 
(Bradford et al. 2014; Tankebe 2009), it may be that efficacy and efficiency are 
strongly linked to legitimacy, studies conducted in developed countries regularly 
find only weak associations between measures of police effectiveness (for example 
in dealing with crimes or maintaining order) and measures of legitimacy (for an 
overview of the European context see Hough et al. 2013). Just as it seems that 
deterrence – the demonstration of effectiveness – has relatively little direct 
influence on offending (although it can have some), effectiveness has relatively 




THE WORK OF LEGITIMACY 
 
Police rely on the legitimacy they command to operate effectively (Tyler, 2003, 
2004). If procedural justice theory is correct that legitimacy is founded most 
importantly in the use of fair process, then the constant need to establish and 
reproduce legitimacy may serve as an important check on police power (Sunshine 
& Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b; Hough et al., 2013). While such power may, in 
a conceptual sense, be ‘unlimited’ – since the police are the arm of that the State 
charged with confronting all possible internal threats to its integrity and effective 
functioning (see Dubber, 2005) – it is limited in an empirical sense by the need for 
police to ensure they do not behave in ways that consistently challenge their 
legitimacy and which might, in the long run, undermine or even remove it. Should 
this occur, the very existence of the organization would be called into question – 
the ultimate extrinsic motivation, perhaps. What this means is that police cannot 
simply ‘do what they want’, despite the extent of the power vested in them, and 
this is for reasons less to do with the law (although the law will of course be 
relevant in some circumstances) and more to do with the fact that every 
interaction they have with citizens is a moment in which legitimacy is tested, 
proved or undermined (Tyler 2011). 
There are, however, some important provisos to this argument. First, it is 
obvious that police organizations can and do act in ways that run against dominant 
norms of probity and fairness without necessarily undermining their legitimacy in 
                                                     
3 Although we note, of course, that these regulations are often honoured more in the breach than in the 
observance, and that criminal justice agencies often behave in ways that are subjectively and objectively 
unfair. 
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any fundamental sense. There are too many examples to count, but one is the 
continued over-use and even abuse of stop and search/frisk, which all available 
evidence suggests has been used unjustly on many occasions in the UK and 
elsewhere. Not only has the legitimacy of the police not collapsed as a result of 
this; public support for the use of stop and search remains, in a general sense, 
high.  
Second, and relatedly, police behaviour that runs counter to norms of 
procedural justice can be, and is, tolerated by some individuals and groups if it is 
directed at denigrated or excluded out-groups. Indeed, since procedural justice is 
not the only factor shaping legitimacy, there may be significant numbers of people 
who might in fact respond positively to police ‘cracking down’ on out-groups and 
grant legitimacy on that basis, at least to some degree (c.f. Harkin 2014). 
Third, it is likely that legitimacy can create the possibility for acting beyond 
established norms, or against community wishes, since it creates a reservoir of 
goodwill on which police can draw and against which they may discount specific 
transgressions; a notion akin to Easton’s (1965) concept of diffuse support. There 
are historical resonances here, in that police abuses in the past were almost 
certainly facilitated by the unquestioning adherence of large sections of the 
population to the legitimacy of the police (see for example Royal Commission on 
the Police 1962): high levels of legitimacy created the space in which police 
malpractice could flourish. However, as the history of policing in a country such as 
the UK shows, this reservoir can be drained, not least by reports of police 
misbehaviour and corruption (Bradford 2011).  
Fourth, the external notion of legitimacy positions the organizational need 
for legitimacy as a kind of ‘natural’ constraint on police power because this 
legitimacy rests on citizens’ experiences of the fairness of police activity. However, 
to the extent that the police do not rely on the policed for legitimacy (i.e. where it 
is granted directly by the state or by some other authority), the need to reproduce 
legitimacy will provide much less of a constraint on behaviour because it is less 
reliant on the quality of the police relationship with the policed.  
        
ENCOURAGING LEGITIMATE POLICING 
 
Provisos aside, it can be argued that the need to establish and reproduce legitimacy 
serves, at least in a country such as the UK, as an important check on police 
power. Because abiding by established norms of fairness is such an important 
factor shaping legitimacy, police have a strong motivation to engage in ethically 
desirable practice; yet this raises an important question. How can officers be 
encouraged to behave in ways that produce and reproduce legitimacy? It is highly 
unlikely that such behaviour will simply arise organically, not least because of the 
well-known disconnect between the ‘police culture’ emphasis on crime-fighting 
and thief-taking and the prioritization of procedural justice among large sections 
of the population (Jonathan-Zamir et al. 2014). It seems that for many police, the 
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way to generate legitimacy is to demonstrate firm effectiveness not treat people 
with procedural fairness.  Equally, the pressures and conflicting priorities under 
which most police operate might seem inimical to the development of 
relationships with the policed based on fairness and shared interests – to police, 
that is, procedural justice often seems nice to do but not essential (Foster et al 
2010). And if legitimacy as a motivating factor remains extrinsic, tied to external 
forces to which police merely respond, then as argued above it is likely to provide 
only a weak check on practice in the long run. An upswing in public concerns 
about fairness might affect police practice in the short term, but once the spotlight 
of media and/or political attention turns elsewhere things are likely to return to 
the status quo ante. 
There is, however, an emerging body of evidence that police activity – the 
actions of individual police officers and the values that underpin them – can be 
influenced by procedural justice within the organization. Just as members of the 
public value fairness, openness, honesty and respect in their interactions with 
police, so officers value these same features of their relationships with their 
superiors (Bradford et al. 2013; Bradford and Quinton 2014; Haas et al. 2015; 
Myhill and Bradford 2013; Schafer 2013; Tankebe 2011; Wolfe and Piquero 2011). 
Research has shown that ‘organizational justice’, a term generally assigned a 
meaning very close to that of procedural justice (Colquitt et al. 2001; Colquitt et al. 
2008), can enhance positive forms identification with the police organization, 
promotes commitment to organization goals and norms, and is associated both 
with positive views about procedurally just and community based modes of 
policing and lower levels of misconduct.  
While little research thus far has directly addressed the issues at hand, it 
seems that one possible way to regulate the power of the police is to ensure that 
those wielding this power – street-level officers – are treated in as organizationally 
just manner as possible by their managers and superiors. Particularly striking is 
research that suggests fairness within police organizations is associated with 
greater ‘buy-in’ to organizational goals (Bradford et al. 2013; Bradford and 
Quinton 2014; Myhill and Bradford 2013; Tankebe 2011), and a diminished 
adherence to problematic beliefs and behaviours (Wolfe and Piquero 2011). On 
these accounts, if police organizations set the correct goals – for example in 
relation to the appropriate use of powers such as stop and search – and 
communicate these to staff effectively, then compliance with them will be 
promoted by use of fair processes within the organization. At one level, this 
appears as a version of social exchange theory – the ‘reward’ of fair treatment (as a 
form of emotional resource) is linked in a reciprocal relationship with behaviours 
that actors believe will stimulate the reward in the future. Much work on 
organizational justice, however, shares with procedural justice theory (e.g. 
Bradford et al. 2014) the idea that fairness at the hands of group authorities – in 
this case superiors within a work setting – promotes identification with the 
organization as a social group and, over time, internalization of its aims and values 
(Tyler and Blader 2000, 2003).  
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Organizational justice - and the positive identification with the police 
organization that it engenders - has also been directly linked to processes of 
internal legitimacy development (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Bradford and 
Quinton 2014). Processes of legitimation are intimately linked with processes of 
identification (Barker 1991) and those with power and authority in a particular 
context are constantly engaged in generating a narrative that both justifies their 
power – turning it into authority in their own minds – and elides the difference 
between the self and the role. ‘Self-legitimacy’, in these terms, is an important 
motivator of behaviour, enabling actions by providing them with direction and 
meaning. Behaviour that fits a self-legitimating narrative reinforces the feeling of 
justified authority those with power require if they are to maintain an appropriate 
image of themselves and confidence in their own authority. This narrative also 
helps constitute a set of claims to legitimacy, and is a key part of the legitimacy 
dialogue envisaged by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012). 
Bradford and Quinton (2014) found that identification with the police 
organization was very strongly correlated with officer’s confidence in their own 
authority (their sense that their use of power was justified), and that both 
identification and self-legitimacy predicted attitudes toward policing means, such 
as the appropriate use of force, and ends, such as protecting suspect’s rights. 
Working with a sample of police officers from an English constabulary, they 
argued that identification with the police force promoted ‘buy-in’ to its values, and 
promoting or acting on these values became an important part of the officer’s 
construction of self and understanding of themselves as figures of authority in 
society. 
There is a possibility, therefore, that there is a virtuous circle that links 
organizational justice within the police organization, through officer’s 
identification as police, to their sense that their power and authority is justified. 
Identification and legitimation motivate attitudes and behaviours that ‘fit’ with the 
narrative of justified authority of which they are part. The obvious problem is that 
identification and legitimation within police organizations might, absent a clearly 
expressed and honestly held set of ethical goals and criteria for success, encourage 
officers to behave in ways different to those outlined above. That is, the narrative 
of policing has to be based on a more or less clearly expressed set of ends and 
means, and these have to be the right ends and means in a ethical sense for the 
above process to be considered ‘virtuous’. Police organizations need to 
communicate clearly to staff how they are expected to behave, and why, if 
organizational justice is to lead to or promote ethical behaviour ‘on the streets’. 
Because officers internalize the values the organization expresses to them as part 
of the process of identification and legitimation, it follows that if these are the 
wrong values then behaviours that reinforce the narrative of self-legitimacy might 
look rather different. 
Stop and search again provides a useful example of this latter kind of process. 
As suggested above police organizations all too often over-stress, to both internal 
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and external audiences, the need for and desirability of instrumental effectiveness 
in relation to crime over other aspects of police-work, such as its more service- 
and even social service-related aspects (Punch 1979). Based in some of the classic 
elements of ‘police culture’, such as the thin blue line ideology and the emphasis 
on ‘thief-taking’ (Reiner 2010), and also the continued dominance of deterrence-
based thinking in police policy and political discourse, this emphasis 
communicates to officers that what is really important is ‘getting results’. This in 
turn becomes a value and an aim, working towards which is integrated into their 
identity as police officers and their sense of their own legitimacy. Stop and search 
practice – more or less pro-active policing aimed at solving or preventing crimes 
and asserting order on the streets – may then be an important element in both 
officer’s self-legitimacy and the legitimation claims they make to others. Despite 
the problematic history of stop and search, this is a power that can nevertheless 
represent the activity of policing in important ways, its chance for success and the 
place of police in wider society. Stop and search may serve as a mechanism 
through which legitimacy is claimed; the need to make such claims, and the types 
of benefits they might bring for police if successful, may provide one set of 
reasons for its continued use.  
It is also undoubtedly the case that there is significant support for stop and 
search – and pro-active and even aggressive policing styles more generally – 
among the general public, certainly in a general sense and, on occasion, in specific 
instances (Fitzgerald et al. 2002). Pro-active, and sometimes aggressive, policing is 
popular among a significant proportion of the population (Girling et al. 2000), at 
least as long as it is not aimed at them (ibid.), and it is not entirely unreasonable 
for police managers to respond to such preferences by encouraging officers to use 
stop and search. In other words, as well as pressure from within the service that 
can be both cultural and managerial, there are external factors that may encourage 
police to believe increased, or at least continued, use of stop and search is not only 
acceptable but desirable and supported by the communities they serve. 
Responding to community priorities is central to legitimation processes, at least in 
as much as these embedded in discursive or dialogical forms of legitimacy, and we 
should not imagine that such community priorities revolve only around procedural 
justice. Most obviously, significant numbers of people in many social settings will 
as noted wish police to target and control ‘difficult’, ‘recalcitrant’ or simply 
different population groups, and the extent to which they grant police legitimacy 
will be based, in part, on the perceived success or failure of such efforts. 
The key to ethical practice in this area would thus seem to be promotion of 
organizational structures and processes that encourage appeals to notions of 
fairness, dignity and respect that cross the boundaries of the police organization 
(i.e. that are important both within it and in its relationship with external actors) 
while at the same time minimizing the valence of more atavistic strands of public 
opinion. Stop and search stands for a much wider set of police powers, practices 
and policies situated in the nexus formed by these competing forces. Indeed 
providing at least a provisional reconciliation of these forces – charting a course 
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between the need to be responsive to the desires and wishes of the policed and the 
need to resist some of those desires – is, arguably, a key task of the police: albeit 




SOME CLOSING WORDS 
 
Our discussion has emphasized the need for those at the top of police 
organizations to promote ethical policing practice that will, in as much as it is 
based on fair process, serve to bolster legitimacy. Equally, the reconfiguration of 
internal structures along the lines of organizational justice should motivate 
individual officers to internalize such values and enact them in their day-to-day 
activity. These processes can and indeed possibly do place ethical constraints 
around the exercise of discretionary police power, and we have considered in this 
paper the idea that legitimacy inside and outside the police provides a useful 
source of moral regulation – particularly when the need or desire to reproduce 
legitimacy is operative within a context marked by high levels of visibility around 
policing.  
Yet, while the quest to win and maintain legitimacy through fair, neutral and 
equitable policing may be an important constraint on police power, its usefulness 
relies to a significant degree on the extent to which police (a) understand and act 
on what people ‘really want’ from policing but also (b) are operating according to a 
set of normatively justifiable set of ends and means. The empirical legitimacy of 
the police is not an absolute limit on the exercise of police power; the extent to 
which (the need for) legitimacy constrains police action is conditional on the 
criteria used by the policed to assess the police. In as much as their assessments 
revolve around principles of procedural justice, police power will be constrained 
and channelled in ethically desirable directions. Where other factors become more 
important, this restraint may be attenuated and even removed. One obvious 
conclusion here is, unsurprisingly, that recourse to normative concepts of 
legitimacy is needed to ‘ground’ this relationship in a set of objective criteria 
against which police can be judged. It will not be enough to claim, or even 
demonstrate, that there is widespread public support for police activity – this 
activity must also be held up against ethical and legal norms that establish its 
legitimacy in a quite different sense. 
Of yet more concern is the possibility that legitimacy also enables 
malpractice. Our claim that it is a useful constraint on police power is empirical 
rather than normative, and it is easy to envisage situations where there is ‘too 
much’ legitimacy, a state of affairs that would seem likely to open up space for, 
allow, and even encourage normatively undesirable police activity. As noted above, 
there is much to suggest that, historically, a broadly unquestioned legitimacy 
allowed the British police if not necessarily to get away with murder then often 
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something very close. Which is to claim that there is a significant, and probably 
irreconcilable, tension – or even paradox – at the heart of our argument. Police 
need legitimacy to survive, and are thus constrained in their use of power by the 
need to demonstrate procedural and other forms of fairness. But legitimacy also 
enables police to wield their power, provides a reservoir of support in the face of 
individual malpractice, and possibly even mandates problematic modes of policing. 
The interplay between these countervailing factors, and their particular 
configuration at any point in time, is likely to have a significant effect on practices 
such as stop and search – the ends towards which they are directed, how they are 
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